In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in he Prisoners' Dilemma and other social dilemmas. These mechanisms include assortative or networked social interactions, reciprocity rules to establish cooperation as a social norm, or simultaneous competition between individuals favoring cheaters and competition between groups favoring cooperators. Here, we build on recent mathematical tools describing the dynamics of multilevel selection to to consider the role that assortment and reciprocity mechanisms play in facilitating cooperation in concert with multilevel selection. Using a deterministic partial differential equation variant of the replicator equation including the effects of within-group and between-group competition, we demonstrate the synergistic effects between population structure within groups and the competitive ability of cooperative groups when groups compete according to collective payoff.
Introduction
It is helpful for many biological questions to explore through the lens of multilevel selection, examining how there are conflicts between selective forces operating at different organizational levels. Selection on multiple levels readily arises in settings varying from the formation of protocells and the origins of life [1] [2] [3] , collective behavior in animal groups [4] , the evolution of aggresive or cooperative behavior of ant queens [5] , host-microbe mutualisms in the microbiome [6] , and competition between pathogen strains under both immunological dynamics and epidemiogical dynamics [7, 8] . The evolution of cooperation provides a useful case study for questions of multilevel selection, and evolutionary game theory provides an instructive analytical framework for analyzing the tension between the interests of a group and the interests of the individuals comprising the group.
In the literature of evolution of cooperation, there has been an emphasis on the roles of population structure in facilitating the possibility of cooperation that cannot be achieved on its own in a well-mixed population described by a Wright-Fisher or Moran process in finite populations or by the replicator dynamics in the infinite population limit. In particular, Nowak identifies five key mechanisms for promotion of the evolution of cooperation: kin selection / asssortment, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group / multilevel selection [9] . We explore how several of these other interaction strucures can be combined with multilevel selection in the search to achieve cooperation. In some sense, the evolution of cooperation within a group can be considered the emergence of an entity operating at a higher level of selection [3, 9] . Achieving higher levels of biological complexity can be buoyed by mechanisms which hinder the lower-level advantages of cheater types. The breakdown of regulatory mechanisms like programmed cell death or copy number regulation is considered a characteristic property of cancer [10] and can be associated with aging through the eventual dominance of cheater types in mitochondrial DNA evolution [11] .
A model of multilevel selection in evolutionary games was introduced by Traulsen and Nowak [12] and further studied by Traulsen et al and Boetcher and Nagler [13, 14] . As a baseline model for multilevel selection, we will take the multilevel replicator dynamics introduced by Luo and coauthors [15] [16] [17] and extended to multilevel games by Cooney [18, 19] . Luo introduced a stochastic description for a two-level selection process with two types of individuals, one with an advantage at individuallevel reproduction and the other conferring an advantage to its group in group-level reproduction. The multilevel replicator dynamics is a deterministic partial differential equation (PDE) description of the distribution of the composition of cooperators and defectors in groups, with two terms describing the effects of within-group competition and between-group competition. This framework provides an analytically tractable approach to study the conflicts between these levels of selection, and can be extended to include more realism for group-level events [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] .
In previous work on the multilevel replicator dynamics, the main characterization of the behavior of the multilevel dynamics is to determine whether within-group or between-group dynamics dominate in the long run, and whether the population converges to a delta-concentration at equilibrium of the within-group dynamics or if the population achieves a nontrivial steady state producing additional cooperation [17] [18] [19] . A particularly interesting phenomenon found in this analysis is the shadow of lower-level selection: for games in which groups are best off with a mix of cooperators and defectors, no level of between-group competition strength can produce the optimal proportion of cooperators [18, 19] . In this paper, we will explore whether implementing mechanisms of assortment or reciprocity can facilitate cooperation via multilevel selection, and we are particularly interested in seeing whether these mechanisms can help to erase the shadow of lower-level selection.
First, we consider an extension of these multilevel selection model in which strategic interactions are assortative: cooperators are more likely to interact with cooperators and defectors are more likely to interact with defectors. We follow the approach of Grafen [25] by assuming that individuals have a greater probability of interacting with individual with the same strategy. This can be used to model the effects of relatedness and kin selection, or to understand how strategy-based homophily can be used to promote cooperation. An endogenous model of strategic homophily or heterophily was introduced by Pacheco et al [26, 27] , in which individuals create and break links based on payoff received through interactions on the link, which can serve as a microfoundation for the exogeneous assortment probabilities.
We also consider an extension of this model in which strategic interactions occur on a k-regular random graph [28, 29] , and show that graph interactions can, in effect, change a game from one in which group average payoff is maximized for intermediate cooperation to one in which full cooperation is optimal for groups. We also explore the role of reciprocity, manifested as rewards for cooperation or punishment for defection. We study both models of direct and indirect reciprocity, distinguished by whether one punishes an individual who cheated against one in the past or whether one punishes individuals who have a reputation for cheating against anyone. For indirect reciprocity, we take Nowak and Sigmund's model in which cooperators have a probability of identifying a defector through their reputation and punishing the defector by defecting as well [30] . For direct reciprocity, we study the competition between defectors and individuals playing the Tit-for-Tat strategyi in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma asinitially studied by Axelrod [31] [32] [33] .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the original model for the multilevel replicator dynamics, and describe the general behavior of the multilevel dynamics in the presence of an arbitrary mechanism of assortment or reciprocity. In Section 3, we address the model of assortative interactions. In Sections 4 and 5 we address indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity, respectively. We consider the role of network reciprocity in the special case of games on k-regular graphs with death-birth updating in Section 6. We conclude in Section ?? with a discussion on the behaviors found across the models and connections with the well-mixed model and the shadow of lower-level selection.
Evolutionary Games and Replicator Dynamics
Here we will illustrate the baseline model for deterministic multilevel selection for evolutionary games with well-mixed strategic interactions, as introduced by Cooney [18] . We consider two-strategy games, in which individuals can either choose to Cooperate (C) or Defect (D), and individuals receive payoff from pairwise interaction given by the following payoff matrix
where the payoffs correspond to Reward, Sucker, Temptation, and Punishment. Four games of interest to our analysis are the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), the Hawk-Dove (HD) game, the stag hunt (SH), and the Prisoners' Delight (PDel), which are characterized by the following rankings of payoffs [34] P D : T > R > P > S (2.2a)
. In terms of individual payoff dynamics, the PD promotes dominance of defectors, the HD game promotes coexistence of cooperators and defectors, the SH promotes bistability between dominance of defectors and dominance of cooperators, and the PDel promotes dominance of cooperators.
In a group composed of fraction x cooperators and 1 − x defectors, the expected payoffs received by cooperators and defectors in well-mixed interactions are
and the average payoff of individuals in a group with x fraction cooperators is
Recently, the multilevel selection framework of Luo and Mattingly was applied to study the simulateneous competition between individuals based on individual payoff and competition between groups following the average payoff of group memebers [17] [18] [19] . A nonlocal partial differential equation was derived to describe the changing probability density of groups at time t composed of a fraction of x cooperators, f (t, x), which is the natural analogue of the replicator dynamics in the context of multilevel selection. The dynamics are given by
For two-strategy social dilemmas, there are three generic behaviors of interest for the within-group dynamics and how the within-group dynamics relate to the between-group dynamics. For the Prisoners' Dilemma, the full-defector equilibrium (x = 0) is globally stable under the within-group replicator dynamics, while the Hawk-Dave game has a globally stable interior equilibrium, and the Stag-Hunt and Prisoners' Delight games feature local stability full-cooperator groups. General behaviors have been shown to appear for these three archetypical games, which can depend on the Hölder exponent near x = 1 of the initial density f 0 (x), a property of the tail of the initial distribution [19] . 
For the PD and HD games, it was shown that the Hölder exponent near x = 1 is preserved in time for solutions to Equation ??. We now describe the generic behaviors of the PD, HD, and SH games that can stand in for games played with our structured population mechanisms [19] .
1. For PD games with an initial distribution with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, there is a threshold level of relative selection strength
such that the population f (t, x) → δ(x) (concentration upon the full-defector equilibrium) if λ < λ * P D . If λ > λ * , there is a unique steady state with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, so we conjecture that the population will converge to this steady state.
2. For HD games with an initial distribution with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, there is a threshold level of relative selection strength
such that the population f (t, x) → δ(x − x eq ) (concentration upon the within-group HD equilibrium) if λ < λ * HD . If λ > λ * , there is a unique steady state with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, so we conjecture that the population will converge to this steady state.
3. For SH and PDel games, the population converges to δ(1 − x), a delta mass at x = 1, if λ > 0 and at least some initial probability is located in the basin of attraction of the full-cooperator equilibrium.
Generalized Dynamics
Before we introduce the specific assortment and reciprocity mechanisms, we will study a more general two-level selection process that contains the dynamics with these mechanisms as a special case. We consider a game with a structure parameter ς, which could represent assortment, neighborhood size, social reputation, etc. This can be thought of in a somewhat similar manner to the structure coeffcient σ for fixation probabilities of cooperation in evolutionary games in structured populations [35, 36] , but there is no intention right now to unify the concept in the same way. Cooperators and defectors receive payoffs π ς C (x) and π ς D (x) in group with x fraction of cooperators, whiles groups with x fraction of cooperators receives average payoff of
For all of the examples we will study, it is fine to assume that the defector's advantage is an affine function of the form π ς D (x) − π ς C (x) = a + bx, and therefore the advantage varies constantly with x, or
Multilevel dynamics follow modified replicator dynamics given by
In the PD regime of the structured population dynamics, we can look to find steady state solutions of Equation 2.9. We can find that, if all-defection is the within-group equilibrium, that steady states of Equation 2.9 satisfy the implicit expression
Recalling that the Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 is preserved for our multilevel dynamics, it is reasonable to parameterize our steady state solutions by this quantity. Because we have a density description, we use Equation 2.10 to compute that
Using the definition of Hölder exponent, we see that the the Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 is given by
Using this expression, we can rewrite our steady state densities in terms of θ as follows
(2.12) In order for this probability density to be integrable (and therefore actually a probability density) there is a threshold level of between-group competition required to obtain any cooperation through between-group competition
For these steady states, we can use Equation 2.11 to find that the average payoff of population is
In particular, we can rewrite the expression for the average population at steady state by using the threshold selection intensity λ * ς , which gives us
Notably, this means that the average payoff of the population is limited by the average payoff of full cooperator groups. Then, for group fitness functions G ς (x) maximized at an intermediate level of cooperation, the steady state population cannot achieve the maximal average payoff possible to the population, even as selection strength at the between-group level becomes infinitely strong.
Similarly, we can show, in the case that x ς eq is the stable equilibrium of the within-group dynamics, that steady state densities take the form
where p(x) is given by the righthand side of Equation 2.12. In the latter case, in order for the steady state density to be integrable near x ς eq , we need the exponent of π ς D (x) − π ς C (x) to exceed −1, or we equivalently require that
Because the defector's advantage is increasing in x,we know that bx ς eq (1 − x ς eq ) > 0, and therefore this condition becomes
Noting that when x ς eq = 0 we have that G ς (x ς eq ) = G ς (0) = 0, it turns out that our for integrability of steady states given by Equations 2.13 and 2.16 coincide precisely when the interior within-group equilibrium x ς eq coincides with the full-defection within-group equilibrium. As a consequence, the threshold level of between group selection needed to obtain cooperation in excess of that achieved by within-group selection alone passes continuously from λ * ς to λ * * ς as the structure parameter ς varies to alter the within-group dynamics from favoring full-defection to favoring an interior mix of cooperation and defection. When x ς eq is the stable equilibrium of within-group dynamics, we can use our expression for threshold group-level selection strength λ * * ς to describe average payoff at steady state, yielding
Within-Group Assortment
We consider game-theoretic interactions within groups which follow an r-assortment process as introduced by Grafen and studied in various deterministic and stochastic settings [25, [37] [38] [39] . In particular, we assume a form of like-with-like assortment in which, with probability r, individuals play the game with an individual with the same strategy, while, with probability 1 − r, individuals play the game with a randomly chosen member of their group. In an infinitely large group with a fraction x of cooperators, the expected payoff of a cooperator π r C (x) and of a defector π r D (x) under this assortment process is
We can also under the role of the assortment process by describing the expected payoff with the following transformed payoff matrix for well-mixed interactions [9, 40 ]
We see that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
The within-group dynamics have equilibria at 0, 1, and a third point x eq r satisfying π r C (x eq) r = π r D (x eq r ). Using Equation 3.3, we see that this third potentially interior equilibrium is given by
We note that
> 0 when α < 0, so the potential interior equilibrium level of within-group cooperation is increasing in r. Furthermore, we see that there exists r s W and r a W such that for any r ∈ [r s W , r a W ], x r eq ∈ [0, 1]. We choose this notation to indicate that r s W is the minimum value of r above which that some (s) cooperation is promoted by within-group selection, which is achieved by the r at which x r eq = 0, which is found from Equation 3.4 to be
Similarly, we define r a W as the minimum level of r above which all cooperation (a) is favored by withingroup selection, and corresponds to the level of r at which x r eq = 1, which we can find via Equation 3.4 to be
where we know the last inequality because x r eq is increasing in r and that x 0 eq = x eq = − β α < 0 for PDs with α < 0. In this paper, we are primarily focused on the case of the PD in which group payoff can have an intermediate optimum, so most of our analysis assumes α < 0. If instead we considered α > 0, we would find that x r eq would start out above 1 when r = 0 and that x r eq is a decreasing function of r, resulting in a region of bistability of full-cooperation and full-defection before cooperation becomes dominant for sufficiently large r. We will address the multilevel dynamics of the α > 0 case briefly, but we will delay discussion of the bistable within-group dynamics until Section 4, in which bistable within-group dynamics arise for underlying PD games with intermediate group payoff maxima.
The average payoff for a group with interactions following an r-process is given by
We see that the group payoff function interpolates between the group payoff function for well-mixed interations G 0 (x) = γx + αx 2 = G(x) when r = 0 to an affine function of cooperator composition 
, we see that average group payoff is maximized by the fraction of cooperators x * r given by
In terms of our parameters α, β, and γ, the critical assortment parameter above which between-group competition most favors full-cooperator groups is
Notably, this means that r B = 0 (no assortment needed) for full-cooperator groups to achieve optimal average payoff when γ = −α, while there exists an r B ∈ (0, 1) such that the most fit group composition x * r is less than 1 for r < r B and is the full-cooperator group for r ≥ r B . This means that any Prisoner's Dilemma whose average payoff is maximized by intermediate fractions of cooperator for wellmixed within-group interactions can have maximal average payoff achieved by full-cooperator groups if interactions occur with sufficiently strong assortment, so assortment can be used as a mechanism to overcome the shadow of lower level selection. We also note that when α < 0 (i.e. our main case of interest)
which means that assortment always increases the level of cooperation in the group composition that maximizes average payoff, pushing the goal of between-group competition to fix on the type without the individual-level advantage.
From our characerization of the within-group dynamics and group payoff function, we construct two possible bifurcation diagrams for the assortment process in Figure 1 . We do not have a definitive ordering on r s W and r B , but we do know that r s W < r B and r B < r a W for all PDs with α < 0, and therefore we include both the possibilities that r B < r s W < r a W (left) and r s W < r B < r a W (right). In the former case, we have left the regime of intermediate payoff optima and the shadow of lower-level selection while the multilevel dynamics are still in PD regime, while in the latter case we first transition from the PD regime to the HD regime and then encounter group payoff functions that are maximized by full-cooperator groups. In either case, we see that the multilevel assortment dynamics starting out in the PD regime with intermediate fitness optima first shift to the HD multilevel regime and then into the PDel regime. From the individual and group payoff functions, we can calculate that π r D (1) − π r C (1) = r(γ − β) + β + α and that G r (1) = γ + α. Using these expressions and Equation 2.14, we can find that the average payoff at steady state is
so the average payoff at steady state is increasing as assortment increases. We can similarly use Equation 2.13 to find that the minimum relevant selection strength to achieve cooperation is
and we see that we decrease the threshold of between-group selection intensity as assortment decreases.
In Figure 2 , we can plot the average payoff at steady-state for various values of λ and r. We see that the threshold level of selection strength λ * r needed to achieve cooperation is decreasing in r, and that group payoff G r (·) f λ θ is increasing in r for fixed values of λ. In particular, we see that a substantial amount of the gains in sustaining cooperation occur at levels of r well below r s W when within-group selection would start to allow for some cooperation. This highlights the synergistic effect of assortative interactions on helping to improve group-level outcomes in addition to being individually advantageous for payoff. In Figure 3 , we show a similar heatmap for a PD game with α > 0, for which assortment promotes bistability of full-cooperation and full-defection rather than coexistence of the two strategies for intermediate levels of r. Dynamics of this type are addressed in more detail in the discussion of the reciprocity models. The multilevel HD regime occurs for values of r between these two bounds, and we observe that the threshold λ * * r needed to achieve cooperation vanishes in the limit that r → r a W . 
Indirect Reciprocity
Now we turn to analyzing interactions with reciprocity mechanisms, which punish defectors for their reputation of bad behavior and can help to stabilize populations with an established social norm of cooperation. As a first example of reciprocity mechanism, we consider a model of Nowak and Sigmund for social interactions with indirect reciprocity in which cooperators sometimes detect that their opponent is a defector and punish them for their defector status [30] . This can be seen as a distinct mechanism from direct reciprocity in repeated games, which we address in Section 5, because individuals are not necessarily punishing defectors for a transgression in a past interaction between the two players, but because the defector has defected against someone in the population at all. While we can incorporate more mechanistic descriptions of reputation effects [41, 42] , the model of Nowak and Sigmund is particularly tractible to include within our multilevel selection framework.
As in Nowak and Sigmund, we assume, when a cooperator interacts with a defector, that they recognize the defector with probability q and punsish them with defection, while with probability 1 − q, they do not recognize the defector and choose to cooperate. Using these rules, we see that cooperators and defectors have the following expected payoffs
For this process, it can also be helpful to view the detection probability q and the expected payoffs in terms of a transformed payoff matrix
We can rearrange the payoffs of Equation 4.1 to write them as perturbations of the payoffs from well-mixed interactions as
and we see that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
The within-group dynamics have equilibria at 0, 1, and a third point x esatisfying π q C (x eq) q = π q D (x e). Using Equation 4.3, we see that this third equilbrium is given by
Then we see that x e< 0 for q < −α γ and x e> 0 for q > −α γ . Further noticing that x e≤ 1 when q ≤ −(β+α) γ−β ∈ (0, 1). Analyzing the stability of the equlibria 0, 1, and x e, we verify that 0 and 1 become bistable when x edecreases below 1. Therefore, achievement of cooperation through within-group selection alone becomes possible when q increases above the threshold value
Average payoff in a group with fraction x cooperators is given by
We can also write the group payoff in terms of q and the game parameters α and γ as
where we see that G q (x) interpolates between the well-mixed group payoff function G 0 (x) = P + γx + αx 2 = G(x) (with corresponding intermediate payoff optimum when γ + 2α < 0) when q = 0 to a payoff function G 1 (x) = P + (γ + α) x 2 increasing on all of [0, 1] when q = 1. We observe that G q (x) has a critical point at x * q = (1−q)γ −2(α+qγ) , which is a local maximum when α + qγ < 0 or when q < −α γ . Further, this critical point is biologically feasible when x * q ≤ 1, or when q < −2α γ − 1 ∈ (0, 1) for the Prisoners' Dilemmas with intermediate fitness optima satisfying x * = γ −2α ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). Because the group type maximizing average payoff is 1 when x * q > 1, we see that the group type maximizing average payoff can be expressed as
Further, we denote that the level of detection probability at which group average payoff is maximized at full cooperation by
From analyzing the within-group dynamics and the group average payoff, we have defined two threshold quantities, q W G and q BG , describing respectively the detection probabilities needed to promote cooperation via within-group selection and for full-cooperator groups to have highest average payoff. Now, we observe that q BG ≤ q W G , so that the alignment of group average payoff to support full cooperation happens at lower detection probabilities than the probability of detection neeed to achieve cooperation by within-group selection alone. To see this, we instead suppose that q W G < q BG , and use Equations 4.4 and 4.7 to see that this is equivalent to
which contradicts the fact that β < 0 for the Prisoner's Dilemma. As a consequence, it is not possible to both have locally stable full-cooperation due to within-group selection and a group-level competition favoring a group with a mix of cooperators and defectors over full-cooperator groups. Once we have enough detection to achieve cooperation within-group for some initial group compositions, we already also have that the fastest reproducing groups are full-cooperator groups.
From the above properties of individual and collective payoff functions π q C (x), π q D (x), and G q (x), we are able to illustrate in Figure 4 the generic bifurcation for the two-level q-process dynamics for the PD with intemediate group payoff optimum. In particular, we see as q increases that optimal group composition x * q increases to 1 as q increases to q BG , while within-group dynamics still favor full-defection in this regime and the multilevel dynamics still resemble the PD. Then, as q increases past q W G , the unstable equilibrium x eappears, allowing for the bistability of full-cooperation and full-defection under the within-group dynamics and moving the multilevel dynamics into the SH regime. As q further increases to 1, the basin of attraction of the full-cooperator equilibrium expands to all possible within-group states and the multilevel dynamics resemble the PDel game. The leftmost dot-dashed gray line corresponds to q BG , the detection probability above which group payoff G q (x) is best off with full cooperation, and the rightmost gray line corresponds to q W G , the detection probability above which full-cooperation is locally stable within groups.
Using these formulas, we see that G(1) = γ + α and that π q D (1) − π q C (1) = − (β + α) − q (γ − β), then when q < q W G and the multilevel dynamics are of the PD type, we see from Equation 2.13 that the threshold level of relative selection strength needed to achieve cooperation is
Further, we see that
so the relative level of between-group competition needed to achieve any cooperation decreases to 0 in the limit as q → q W G in which within-group selection is sufficient to sustain cooperation through within-group selection alone.
We notice that ∂λ * q ∂q = − θ(γ−β) γ+α < 0, so the threshold level of selection intensity needed to obtain any cooperation decreases as the recognition probability q increases. Using our formulas for π q D (1) − π q C (1) and G q (1), we can use Equation 2.14 to see that the average payoff at the steady state density is
so the average payoff at steady state is increasing as assortment increases. Further, we see that as
, in agreement with the observation that the multilevel dynamics are in the SH regime when q > q W G and the population should concentrate at the full-cooperator equilibrium.
In Figure 5 , we illustrate the average payoff at steady state as a heatmap depending on the detection probability q and the relative selection strength λ. The figure shows that increasing q decreases the threshold λ * q needed to achieve cooperation (and therefore nonzero steady state payoff) and increases the average payoff G q (·) f λ θ . The gray dashed line indicates the point δ W G at which we transition from the PD regime to the SH regime (in which full-cooperation is achieved by any positive λ). 
Multilevel Selection in a Repeated Game
The deterministic evolutionary dynamics of strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma was explored by Imhof et al, who demonstrated that cylces and stable fixed points can be achieved under the replicator dynamics in a single group with players of always cooperate (All-C), always defect (All-D) and tit-for-tat (TFT) [43] . In this section, we will analyze the multilevel dynamics for Equation 2.9 for which strategic interactions consist of a repeated PD and the population is composed of individuals playing All-D and either TFT or a the strategy Grim-Trigger (GRIM).
The GRIM strategy specifies that a player cooperates in the first round, and then continues to cooperate until their opponent defects against them, after which the player will punish their opponent by defecting thereafter. A TFT player cooperates in the first round and reciprocates their opponent's action from the previous round in all subsequent rounds. When playing against an opponent with the same strategy, both a TFT and GRIM player will always cooperate because they and their opponent start the first round by cooperating and reciprocate with cooperation in all previous rounds. When playing against an All-D player, both a TFT and GRIM player will cooperate in the first round, and then punish their opponent with defection in all subsequent rounds. Because the payoffs will be the same if we consider a population of TFT and All-D players or a population of GRIM and All-D players, we will stick to the name TFT for convenience.
We will denote by x the fraction of TFT strategists in a group, where the remaining fraction 1 − x of group members play All-D. If the discount rate for a time-step, or alternately the probability of termination of the repeated game, is δ, then the expected payoff for pariswise interactions in a population of TFT and All-D players follow the payoff matrix
where these expected payoffs come from the rule that TFT players cooperate until they meet a first defection from a defector. Then, the expected payoffs to TFT and All-D players in a group composed of fraction x TFT players are
In terms of the original PD payoff matrix, we can rewrite the payoffs as
This means that the payoff difference between TFT players and All-D players in an x cooperator group is
Then we have that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
and we see that the defector's advantage in a full cooperator groups is given by
From here we see that a defector in an otherwise full-cooperator group has a payoff advantage over its peer cooperators when
while the cooperators have greater payoff than that defector when δ < δ W . In particular, this means that the fixed point at x = 1 will be locally unstable for δ > δ W and locally stable for δ > δ W .
For our repeated games with a given discount rate δ, the average payoff of group members is given by
and this can be simplified, in terms of our paramters γ, α, and β, as
We also find that the average payoff in a full-cooperator group is
As with the other mechanisms, we recover the well-mixed group payoff function as δ → 0, and we find that G δ (x) can become arbitrarily large as δ nears 1. Therefore, for sufficiently strong discounting, we can make the benefit of full-cooperator groups as strong as we would, enabling establishment of cooperative density steady states for relatively lower relative selection strength λ. When 0 ≤ δ < δ W , the multilevel dynamics are in the PD regime, so we expect to see density steady states of the form of Equation 2.12 when relative selection strength λ is sufficienty large. W Then we can use Equation 2.14 the expressions from Equations 5.2 and 5.9 for the repeated game to find that the average payoff of the population at steady state is
Computing the partial derivative of average payoff with respect to δ
we see that the fitness of the population is increased by additional discounting. Similarly, we can calculate from Equation 2.13 that the threshold to establish cooperation through multilevel selection is given by
and we find that
so the threshold for cooperation is decreasing in δ and cooperation is faciliated by additional discounting. As we see that discounting improves the maximal possible payoff achieved by groups, it is potentially unfair to measure payoff for an entire repeated game in terms of the payoff matrix of the one-shot stage game. Alternatively, we can consider the possibility of measuring the payoff of the repeated game in the units of the stage game, using the notion of discounted average payoff [44] . We discount the realized payoffs of TFT and All-D players by a factor of 1 − δ corresponding to counteract the denominator 
Graph Structure within Groups
We can also study our multilevel selection process when the game-theoretic interactions and withingroup selection events take place on a k-regular graph, a random graph where each node has exactly k edges. For within-group dynamics, these evolutionary games were studied Ohtsuki et al [28, 29] . Ohtsuki et al derived different versions of the replicator dynamics of graphs, corresponding to the rules by which individuals updated their strategy. The processes studied included • Death-Birth updating: a random individual is chosen to die and its neighbors compete with probability proportional to payoff to reproduce and replace their neighbor
• Birth-Death updating: an individual is chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to payoff, and their offspring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor.
In the case of death-birth updating, Ohtsuki et al derived a version of the replicator dynamics for games on k-regular graphs given by
where ξ := (k + 1)(k − 2)(R − S − T + P ) and χ := (k + 1)R + (k 2 − k − 1)S − T − (k 2 − 1)P . This euqation can also be thought of as the replicator dynamics for games on a well-mixed population with transformed payoff matrix in Equation 6.2, the average payoff for a well-mixed group playing that game
Notably, while the replicator dynamics on graphs is equivalent for the replicator dynamics for the above game on a well-mixed population, we see that the total payoff generated by interactions is 2R for two cooperators, 2P for two defectors, and S + T for a cooperator and a defector, so the average payoff for a group playing a game on Equation 6.2 is still G b CD = G(x). As a result, the payoff transformation doesn't actually change average payoff, but rather transfers payoff from defectors to cooperators when a cooperator and defector play against each other. Because the transformed payoff matrix doesn't reflect how average group payoff changes when interactions occur on a k-regular graph, we must calculate average group payoff on these graphs to study the dynamics of our multilevel selection process.
For a cooperator on such a regular k-graph, a cooperator and defector receive expected payoffs of
where q (A|B) is the conditional probability that the neighbor of an B player is an A player. Using the pair approximation of Ohtsuki et al [28, 29] , the conditional probability of connections equilibrates to q C|D = k−2 k−1 x and q D|C = k−2 k−1 (1 − x), which gives us
Then, the average group payoff for a group structured on a regular k-graph is G k (x) = xπ k C (x) + (1 − x)π k D , and we can deduce that
is a convex combination of the well-mixed group payoff function G(x) for our twoplayer game and (R − P )x, a scaled version of group-level payoff function in the frequency-independent Luo-Mattingly model. For k = 3, the group function G k (x) places 1/3 weight on (R − P )x and 2/3 weight on the well-mixed group payoff function, while we recover the well-mixed group payoff function in the limit as k → ∞.
Noting that R − P = α + γ, so we can also write that G k (x) = γ + α k−1 x + k−2 k−1 αx 2 . Then, combining this group-level reproduction function with the relicator dynamics on graphs of Otsuki et al, we can describe a multi-level selection process with graph structure within-groups using the PDE
So for k = 3, we see that G 3 (x) has its only critical point at γ − 1 2 ∈ [1, 3 2 ), so G 3 (x) is maximized at x * 3 = 1. In the well-mixed limit, we see that
. Therefore a game with such γ and α has average group payoff maximized at an interior fraction of cooperators in (0, 1) with well-mixed interactions, but allowing interactions for the same game to take place on a 3-regular random graph allows average group payoff to be maximized with full cooperation.
What this example illustrates is that, for a two-player game for which the group average payoff G(x) is maximized at an interior strategy x * ∈ (0, 1) for well-mixed groups, it is possible for average group payoff to be maximized at x * 3 = 1 when within-group interactions occur on regular k graph for k = 3. In other words, the presence of graph structure within groups can facilitate further promotion of cooperation in selection at the between-group level. In particular, by increasing the point at which average group payoff G k (x) is maximized, decreasing the degree of social interactions k can facilitate greater abundance of groups with large fractions of cooperators as λ → ∞, and, in particular, choosing small enough k can shift the multi-level selection dynamics from failing to promote any cooperation as λ → ∞ to supporting cooperation, as well as shifting from a regime where x * ∈ (0, 1) as λ → ∞ to one where full cooperation is the most abundant group type in the large λ limit. Now we will explore the capability of graph structure for promoting cooperation through withingroup selection alone, particularly in games with intermediate group payoff maxima. The within-group replicator dynamics on graphs for DB updating has equilibria at x = 0, 1, x k eq , where x k eq is given by
In the case where k = 3, this third equilibrium is given by
Then we see that x 3 eq > 0 when
Because we are interested in studying Prisoner's Dilemma's in which α, β < 0, we can further see that α +β = (R −S −T +P )+(S −P ) = R −T < 0, so β < −α and β α > 1, which means that
is a necessary condition for having an interior equilibrium in the within-group replicator dynamics on a 3-regular graph. Now, we check how the cooperator's disadvantage π k C (x) − π k D (x) varies with k. We see that
For α, β < 0 (and correspondingly β α > 1 for the PD), we can rearrange the above inequality to say that π k C (x) − π k D (x) is increasing when
and therefore we see that π k C (x) − π k D (x) can only increase in k when average group payoff for wellmixed interactions is maximized by full-cooperator groups. This means that the cooperator's advantage increases for decreasing k in games with an intermediate fitness optimum, and therefore cooperator's advantage is maximized at the minimum k = 3. Thus our proof above of global stability of defection in within-group dynamics on the 3-regular graph suffices to demonstrate that defection is globally stable within groups on k-regular graphs as well.
Despite the inability of placing interactions on a k-regular to promote any level of cooperation through individual interactions alone for this class of games, we will now show how graph interactions can help to faciliate improved promotion of cooperation through multilevel selection relative to multilevel selection with well-mixed strategic interactions. As we did for the other mechanisms, we can explore steady states of the PDE from Equation 6.5, and we can find that
Putting these formulas together with Equation 2.14, we can see that the average payoff at steady state for sufficiently large λ will be
We can also see that
which means that the average payoff at steady state increases as we decrease the number of neighbors k for strategic interactions. In particular, this occurs even though the family of games with intermediate group payoff optimal about which we care can't achieve any cooperation through individual-level selection at all. This may be a bit of an extreme case, but it demonstrates how shifting individual interactions can have a positive effect on the ability of groups to achieve cooperation beyond the ability of simply promoting cooperation by maximizing individual payoff.
Discussion
In this paper, we have illustrated the synergistic effects of assortment and reciprocity mechanisms with multilevel selection for promoting cooperation in group-structured populations. In particular, we see that the effects of these mechanisms can help to promote cooperation via multilevel selection at structure parameters much smaller than is required to promote cooperation through individual-level selection alone, and we see that the mechanisms reduce the level of between-group selection intensity needed to achieve cooperation relative to well-mixed strategic interactions within groups. In particular, the example of k-regular graph structure with death-birth updating cannot promote any cooperation in games with intermediate group payoff optima, and therefore we see that studying the impact of these mechanisms on group performance provides a new window into the beneficial nature of local population structure.
By taking a comparative statics approach to study the directional effects of changing population structure [37, 38] , we were also able to glean the impact of our modeling decisions upon the ability of the assortment or reciprocity to support additional cooperation. Furthermore, because we were analyzing continuous families of parametrized multilevel selection problems, the comparative statics approach serves as good motivation to apply the techniques needed to analyze general two-level replicator dynamics [19] , rather than cherry-picking games with solvable within-group dynamics.
Recent models of indirect reciprocity have included three strategies, those who always defect, those who always cooperate, and those who cooperate with high-reputation individuals and defect against low-reputation individuals [42] . Santos et al explore the role of indirect reciprocity under a variety of social norms, classfying the norms which maximimally achieve cooperation [41] . One attributed mechanism to actually achieve the optimal norm is multilevel selection [45, 46] , so a natural question to ask is whether a deterministic model of multilevel selection can be used to determine the evolution of optimal norms. To be able to answer such questions, analytical or numerical progress needs to be made to analyze extensions of our framework to allow for three possible strategies, in which a group's strategic composition is represented as a point on a triangular simplex. As such, this motivating question about the establishment and maintenance of social norms can motivate new mathematical techniques for multilevel selection.
Regarding the shadow of lower-level selection, the assortment and reciprocity mechanisms had mixed results. While it is unquestionable that the mechanisms helped to lower the threshold to achieve cooperation and served to improve the average payoff of the population, the majority of these mechanisms did not expand the maximum possible payoff from the well-mixed group payoff function. In particular, for the assortment, graph, and indirect reciprocity model, it turned out that G ς (x) = γ + α = G(1), the payoff of the full-cooperator group with well-mixed interactions. As such, we see from Equation 2.14 is still limited by G(1). The one exception to this was the direct reciprocity model, in which G δ (1) = 1 1−δ > G(1), which isn't particularly fair because discounting payoffs over multiple rounds produces a large pie of possible payoff. Admittedly, for large enough structure parameters in our model, we are able to achieve full-cooperation, but average payoff of the full-cooperator group is not equal to the unachieved social optimum from the well-mixed model. While it's perfectly reasonable to think that it is difficult to achieve a better outcome than the payoff that a group full of cooperators could achieve, I believe it is a valuable goal for future research to determine whether it is possible to introduce mechanisms that can achieve a better fate than that of a full-cooperator group.
